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1Abstract
We show that redistributive tax and transfer systems have a distortionary e®ect
and an insurance e®ect, if agents face idiosyncratic uninsurable earnings risk. These
two e®ects imply that redistributive taxes decrease both mean consumption and the
standard deviation of consumption. Using household data, we construct an `income
compression' measure of the redistributiveness of the tax system and empirically test
for the presence of these two e®ects by exploiting di®erences in US state taxes. We ¯nd
that tax redistributiveness explains much of the variation in the mean and standard
deviation of the within-state consumption distributions over the US. This provides
evidence for the presence of both distortionary and insurance e®ects of redistributive
taxes and transfers.
JEL Classi¯cation: E21, H20, H31
Keywords: Undiversi¯able Earnings Risk, Tax Distortions, Insurance
21 Introduction
Much analysis of household consumption focuses on the study of choices made by forward-
looking wealth-accumulating agents who face exogenous idiosyncratic labor-income shocks
and liquidity constraints.1 This micro approach to consumption choice has been incorporated
into workable applied macro models since the pioneering work by Bewley (1986), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994), taking macroeconomic analysis beyond the representative agent.
Yet, the inclusion of idiosyncratic risk in a macro framework gave immediate rise to policy
issues. Even in an economy with no externalities, due to market incompleteness, idiosyn-
cratic risk cannot be insured, and hence the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto e±cient.
Liquidity constraints exist in equilibrium, and agents face the probability of not being able
to smooth consumption through borrowing.2
The possibility for Pareto improvement in economies with idiosyncratic risk has led sev-
eral authors to challenge the view that marginal taxes on capital and labor income, in the
absence of externalities, always lead to welfare deteriorations.3 In a macroeconomy with
capital accumulation and idiosyncratic risk, redistributive taxes and transfers on capital and
labor income are expected to have two distinct long-run e®ects on consumption: (i) they
1For example, Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1995), and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) o®er supporting evidence that some combination of precautionary saving and/or liquidity
constraints can be important determinants of saving and consumption dynamics.
2This point is discussed in Aiyagari (1994).
3For example, Aiyagari (1995) extended the Chamley (1986) model to include idiosyncratic labor risk
and showed that the optimal long-run marginal tax on capital is positive. More recently, Conesa, Kitao and
Krueger (2006), argued that the optimal tax rate on capital should be 36% in an overlapping-generations
model with idiosyncratic risk.
3should decrease the observed long-run mean of consumption as marginal taxes reduce the
incentives for saving and capital accumulation, and (ii) they should decrease the observed
standard deviation of consumption across households, through decreasing the e®ective °uc-
tuations of after-tax individual income.4
The traditional approach without idiosyncratic risk has emphasized the ¯rst or distor-
tionary e®ect of taxes which reduces average consumption and reduces welfare. But if house-
holds face uninsured idiosyncratic risk there is also a second and countervailing insurance
e®ect of redistributive taxes which reduces each household's consumption variability and
raises welfare. The relative importance of these two e®ects is crucial for the evaluation of
¯scal policy in macro models with idiosyncratic risk. Hence it is important to empirically
test whether the distortionary and insurance e®ects of redistribution through the tax and
bene¯t system can indeed be observed in the data. To test for these e®ects is therefore a
main aim of our study.
Our analysis starts by simulating a benchmark model of idiosyncratic labor-income shocks
that demonstrates the distortionary and the insurance e®ect of redistributive taxes (and
transfers) on the stationary distribution of consumption. In models of this type, both the
mean and the standard deviation of cross-sectional consumption fall when taxes rise. For
plausible parameters, the insurance e®ect is su±ciently strong for the coe±cient of variation
to fall as taxes increase. Moreover, below some threshold (which depends on the parameters
of the model) welfare improves as taxes increase since the insurance e®ect dominates, but
4Transfers can also relax liquidity constraints, which again increases consumption smoothing and reduces
the need for precautionary saving.
4welfare falls above this threshold point.5
The core of the paper is devoted to examining the empirical evidence on the e®ect of
taxes and transfers on the mean, the standard deviation, and the coe±cient of variation of
consumption, and to quantifying this e®ect. We use data for di®erent US states (treating
each state as a small economy) to investigate the relationship within each state between
redistribution through taxes and transfers, and the distribution of household consumption.
We utilize individual consumption data from about 100,000 American households from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), while we collect household income data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). We calculate the taxes paid by each individual using
the TAXSIM program provided by the NBER. An important innovation of the paper is to
construct a measure of redistribution through the tax system. Using the mean marginal
tax rate and/or some aggregate measure of transfers has serious drawbacks (we discuss this
further below). Our study uses data on each household's income before and after taxes
to construct an income compression measure which more directly captures redistribution
through taxes and transfers.
Using observations from di®erent US states o®ers an appropriate `laboratory' in which to
test the empirical implications of the model since, as we show, variation in state-level taxes
is substantial, allowing for a meaningful interpolative analysis. In contrast, cross-country
variation may instead re°ect di®erences in institutional, cultural and other country-speci¯c
features as well as di®erences in the measurement of the appropriate household level variables
5The insurance e®ect is exactly what gives rise to the study of second-best redistributive policies in the
literature. This study does not investigate second-best taxation in a calibrated model, rather, it tests whether
the insurance e®ect is found in the data.
5in di®erent surveys. These issues are likely to be much less important when comparing across
US states. Moreover, using the same survey across tax regimes reduces the chance that
di®erences in the survey design spuriously generate the di®erent measured policy responses.
We provide evidence that redistribution through the tax and transfer system is negatively
correlated with both the mean and the variance of consumption and quantify the size of
these e®ects. We also ¯nd that the coe±cient of variation of consumption distributions
across US states is negatively correlated with redistributive income taxes, indicating a strong
insurance e®ect. Finding evidence for the presence of an insurance e®ect of taxes on observed
cross-sections of the consumption distributions has deeper implications than simply testing
the impact of policy. It demonstrates a channel through which the e®ects of idiosyncratic
risk on individual decisions are transmitted to the aggregate level. The insurance e®ect
of taxes is important and demonstrable, hence it is important to stress the appropriate
policy tradeo®s (between the distortionary and insurance e®ects) in models of taxes which
incorporate idiosyncratic risk.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we calibrate a benchmark model
economy with idiosyncratic risk and show how tax policies imply both a distortionary and
an insurance e®ect on consumption. In Section 3 we describe the data and compare the tax
system in di®erent US states. We also propose two measures of tax redistributiveness in the
di®erent US states. Section 4 presents the empirical ¯ndings and Section 5 concludes.
62 Theoretical underpinnings
In this section we solve a heterogeneous-agent model µ a la Aiyagari (1994), extended to include
an exogenous redistributive policy. We focus on the e®ects of di®erent redistributive policies
on consumption. We emphasize that the goal of this theoretical analysis is to demonstrate
the presence of the two e®ects and not to conduct a comprehensive quantitative analysis of
optimal policies.
2.1 The Model
Production of ¯nal goods takes place through a large number of identical ¯rms that use
capital and labor as inputs. All ¯rms operate a common neoclassical production technology








with ® 2 (0;1). The function F is endowed with the usual neoclassical properties: dimin-
ishing marginal returns to each factor, constant returns to scale, and the Inada conditions.









Capital depreciates in each period at the constant rate ±, implying that the user cost is
r = R ¡ ±.
We abstract from government spending on public goods, and any possible ine±ciency in
raising revenue and/or spending by governments, and concentrate solely on the redistributive
7aspect of taxes and transfers. Policies are exogenous and constant over time. The government
imposes a ¯xed and pre-speci¯ed marginal tax rate ¿ on capital and labor income and
redistributes the average tax revenues, T, to all individuals, after paying the interest cost
of the steady state government debt, Dt. The government's balanced budget constraint in
each period therefore becomes:
Tt + rDt = ¿rKt + ¿Lt
There are a large number of households that derive utility solely from the consumption
of the ¯nal good. Each household receives an idiosyncratic labor income shock. Households
can smooth their consumption pro¯le via the trading of assets Ait in a capital market that
is characterized by an (exogenous) borrowing constraint. The household pays taxes at rate
¿ on both capital and labor income, but receives a common per-capita lump-sum transfer T
that is ¯nanced from this taxation.6
There is no aggregate uncertainty, but individuals face idiosyncratic labor income shocks,
denoted by Yit. In the stationary equilibrium, all resulting asymptotic distributions in the
economy are time-invariant, even though there is substantial mobility at the individual level.
Aggregate-economy prices are therefore constant, described by the price vector fr;wg.






s.t. (for all t 2 f0;1;::g):
Cit + Ait+1 = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit + T
6US tax jurisdictions rarely distinguish between these di®erent sources of income when assessing the
household's tax liability.
8Ait+1 ¸ ¡b
where ¯ is the constant discount factor, Cit is consumption for individual i at time t; b is







with ½ > 0.
The computations we report allow no borrowing (b = 0) and ¯x the government debt to be
zero.7 Moreover, following Deaton (1991) and Aiyagari (1994), it is convenient to work with
the the total resources available for consumption, or cash on hand (Xit = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait+
(1 ¡ ¿)wYit + T), thus:
Xit+1 = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait+1 + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit+1 + T
= [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r](Xit ¡ Cit) + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit+1 + T
Labor income risk is non-diversi¯able and therefore a®ects households' consumption
paths. Idiosyncratic labor productivity for household i follows the process:
lnYit = 'lnYit¡1 + "it (1)
where ' is close to a unit root.8
7Allowing the borrowing limit to vary exogenously, or changing the government debt, does not a®ect the
qualitative comparative statics of varying the tax rate.
8A large literature in applied labor economics on earnings dynamics either assumes that there exists a unit
root in individual earnings (see Abowd and Card, 1989, and MacCurdy, 1982) or cannot reject the hypothesis
of a unit root (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2001). We do not follow this approach in this paper for two reasons.
First, unit root tests in short panels can have low power; discriminating between a very persistent process
9Recall we assume that government policies are exogenous and constant over time. Hence
all economic agents solve their individual consumption problem given the tax rate and prices.
Prices are determined endogenously to equilibrate asset supply and the demand for capital.
We compute the joint distribution of wealth and labor income (rather than using simulations
of individual life histories) and present these distributions later on in the paper.
2.2 Implications of Varying Tax Rates
Each time period is a year. We use a CRRA coe±cient equal to 3 and ® = 0:36, so that
the labor share in production is about 2
3. The marginal tax rate ranges from zero to forty
percent in ¯ve-percent intervals. The standard deviation of the earnings shocks, ¾", is 0:1.
The depreciation rate of capital is eight percent and the discount rate ¯ve percent. The
persistence in earnings is 0:92.9
The results for some of the variables of interest are presented in Figures 1-9. Higher
taxation leads to a lower equilibrium saving rate for the economy (Figure 1), a higher gross
(and net) interest rate (Figure 2), a lower capital stock (Figure 3) and output and a higher
and a unit root might not be possible. Second, most of the general equilibrium literature with this model
uses an AR(1) process (see Aiyagari (1994), Floden (2001) and Domeij and Heathcote (2002), for instance).
For comparability reasons, we choose a model as close as possible to this speci¯cation.
9We use a seven point approximation and a quadrature method to take expectations (see Burnside (1999)
for a clear exposition of the practical issues involved). We use 100 grid points for the endogenous state
variable (cash on hand) and ensure that the maximum value of cash on hand is always higher than the
maximum possible cash on hand implied by the model (this is done by trial and error). We compute the
time invariant distribution of cash on hand explicitly (rather than using Monte Carlo simulations). Cubic
spline interpolations are used to interpolate between grid points.
10level of transfers (Figure 4). These results capture the distortionary e®ects of higher taxation.
The distortionary e®ects of higher taxes can also be seen in Figure 5 that illustrates how mean
log consumption (¹) falls quite quickly with higher taxes. On the other hand, the dispersion
(standard deviation, ¾) of log consumption in the economy falls (Figure 6); this is the
redistributive e®ect of higher transfers. Moreover, the ratio of the two (relative dispersion= ¾
¹)
falls (Figure 7), implying that the fall in mean consumption is slower than the fall in the
standard deviation of consumption.
To compare welfare we calculate the proportion of consumption that needs to be given
up in each state of the world at any particular tax rate, for households to be indi®erent
between the actual tax rate and having zero taxes. Figure 8 shows that the `most e±cient'
tax rate for our calibration is 16 percent, and agents would be indi®erent between losing
around 2.1 percent of consumption in each state of the world and moving from zero taxes
to 16 percent taxes. The ¯gure also highlights that utility is higher than the zero tax rate
economy for any tax rate under around 36 percent. Figure 9 illustrates more clearly what
happens to the unconditional wealth distribution when taxes are raised. The reduction in
inequality is clearly illustrated: the wealth distribution is always compressed with higher
taxes and transfers.
Figures 1-9 highlight that redistributive taxes can improve welfare if taxes are not too
high, since the insurance e®ect will dominate the distortionary e®ect. But at higher tax rates
the distortionary e®ect will dominate, reducing welfare. These turning points will depend on
the parameters of the model. Our conclusions are robust to varying the structural parameters
of the model. As a general rule, varying structural parameters that increase the value of
11risk-sharing (such as more earnings persistence or higher risk-aversion) increases the value
of redistributive taxation. However higher risk-sharing takes place at the cost of increased
production distortions which reduces mean consumption.10
3 Data
The simple theoretical model illustrates the e®ects of taxes on the ¯rst two consumption mo-
ments. Our empirical analysis explores this further, but ¯rst we describe the data. Household
consumption is measured using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX): a survey of US
households that has operated on a continuous basis since 1980 and has detailed informa-
tion on consumer expenditure and saving. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects
the data to construct the consumer price index and hence the data-set contains extremely
detailed information on the individual components of consumption, as well as a variety of
household characteristics. It also includes the state of residence.11 The survey is designed as
a rotating panel, with households being interviewed 5 times at quarterly intervals (although
the ¯rst is a contact interview from which no information is made available). Each quarter,
households reaching their ¯fth interview are replaced by a new household. Since the sur-
vey records detailed information on each individual expenditure item, we can construct a
measure of non-durable consumption that includes food and beverages, tobacco, housekeep-
ing services, fuel, public utilities, repairs, public transport, personal care, entertainment,
10Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000) argue that di®erences across agents in their rate of time
preference better matches the observed US wealth distribution. Our theoretical results are robust to allowing
heterogeneity in discount rates.
11For con¯dentiality reasons, state information is sometimes suppressed.
12clothing and books, each de°ated by the appropriate price index. We restrict the sample to
those households for which full state information is available, that were interviewed between
1982-1998 and where the head is between the ages of 25 and 55. Furthermore, self-employed
and farming households have been excluded. This results in a sample of around 100,000
households.
Information on household level income and transfers is obtained from the March supple-
ment of the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a Census survey also run by the BLS
and designed to give very detailed and accurate information on income and demographics.
Income is de¯ned as total household labor income. We use income data from the CPS be-
cause it has the advantage of being a much larger survey than the CEX. Another advantage
is that the errors with which income and consumption are measured are likely to be cor-
related when they are taken from the same survey while this is less likely when they come
from di®erent surveys.12
3.1 Household Taxes
Constructing a measure of the tax system in each state is not trivial and entails addressing a
number of problems. We concentrate on income tax, which is raised at both the federal and
state level.13 Income tax systems can be quite complicated, and vary considerably across
12Correlated errors on the LHS and RHS in the regression will bias the regression, and the direction of
this bias can not be determined a priori.
13US households are subject to many di®erent taxes (including income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes
and duty) levied at the federal and state levels, by county administrations, and by schoolboards. We
concentrate on income tax, which is raised at both the federal and state level: our identi¯cation strategy
exploits variation across, but not within, states. Speci¯cally, property taxes and sales taxes are largely levied
13jurisdictions. Table 1 illustrates the complexity of the federal income tax system in 1998:
the federal marginal tax rate varies non-linearly from 15 percent for single people whose
income is less than $26,250 ($43,850 for married couples) up to 39.6 percent for incomes over
$288,350. Furthermore, these tax rates and tax brackets have all changed over the years.
Before 1987 a much larger number of tax brackets was applicable, while before 1996 around
15-20 percent of people had incomes that were not su±ciently high for them to pay any
federal income tax.
Table 2 shows that state marginal tax rates and exemptions di®er widely between states.
It shows that several states, including Texas and Florida, do not levy any income tax on
their residents while New Hampshire and Tennessee only charge tax on dividend and interest
income. The other states have a variety of income tax bands and exemptions (or tax credits)
that are applicable. Although some states, such as Massachusetts and Illinois, have a °at
rate income tax, in most states, the marginal tax rate increases with income. The di®erence
between the highest and lowest marginal tax rate can sometimes be large. In Iowa the lowest
marginal tax rate is 0.36 percent and the highest is 8.98, while several states have marginal
tax rates even higher for the highest earning households. There are also, typically, a variety
of tax allowances to which households are entitled. While there is no tax exempt income in
Pennsylvania, up to $24,000 of income is exempt from state income tax in Connecticut for
at the county/schoolboard/city level which makes it problematic to construct a state level tax measure as
the taxes vary substantially within each state. Moreover, sales taxes are paid at the place of sale rather
than residence, making it di±cult to measure the sales taxes levied on households within the state if cross-
border shopping takes place. In the CEX, the spending ¯gure excludes sales taxes, which makes expenditure
comparable across states.
14married couples. However, Connecticut allows no exempt income for other dependents, in
contrast to Minnesota which allows the same exempt level of income for the earner, their
partner, and each other dependent.
To measure how much redistribution there is through the tax system, information on
transfers is also required; this comes from the CPS. Such transfers include social security and
railroad retirement income, supplementary security income, unemployment compensation,
worker's compensation and veterans payments, public assistance or welfare, and the value
of food stamps received: the CPS asks questions on all these transfers. Table 3 shows that
the average transfer over the whole sampled population amounts to $994, while 22.6 percent
of households receive some sort of transfer. Conditional on receiving at least something,
households receive an average of $4,389. This should be compared to the average household
salary in the survey of $34,281, or $19,483 for those households that are receiving transfers.
While this amount may seem small, for some households it can make a substantial di®erence
to their after tax (and transfer) income.
To construct each household's income tax burden, we exploit the TAXSIM 4.0 program
developed by Freenberg (see Freenberg and Coutts, 1993, for details) which is provided by
the NBER.14 The output of the TAXSIM program allows us to measure of how redistributive
the tax system is in each state. If the marginal tax rate was the same for all households in
14Using a variety of household variables, including a husband's and wife's earnings, interest, dividends
and other income, and information about the household's characteristics (such as the number of dependant
children) and other deductibles (like property costs) as well as the year and state of residence, the program
calculates both the state and the federal tax bracket, tax liability, and marginal tax rate for each household
in the sample, explicitly controlling for a variety of allowances.
15a year and state, then this would be the natural measure of redistributiveness. However, as
we saw earlier, marginal taxes di®er substantially across agents even within the same year
and state. Furthermore, agents have many exemptions, allowances, and transfers available
to them that depend upon their household characteristics. Rather than explicitly model
all the di®erent e®ective marginal taxes (and transfers) that are available, we will instead
reduce the problem to constructing an index that re°ects the \average" marginal tax rate
in each state. While a simpli¯cation, this will allow us to concentrate on how variation in
redistribution through taxes and transfers a®ects consumers.
3.2 Measuring Redistributiveness
No completely satisfactory measure of redistributiveness exists, but some measures are pos-
sible given the output provided by the TAXSIM program. An obvious one is to compute the
average marginal tax rate within each year t and state j. This is calculated as the mean of
the household marginal tax rates obtained from the TAXSIM program. As table 4 shows, the
average federal bracket is 20.2 percent, and the average marginal tax rate (which accounts
for various allowances) is 19.2 percent. The state rates shown in the table vary from zero
in Texas and Florida, which charge no income tax, to an average marginal tax rate of 7.4
percent in New York.
This measure, however, accounts neither for transfers nor for heterogeneity amongst
household tax rates. For instance, a mean marginal tax rate of 20 per cent in a state could
be due to all households paying a marginal tax rate of 20 per cent; to the bottom ¯fth of the
population paying 100 percent and the rest nothing; or to the top 20 per cent paying 100
16percent and the rest nothing. These three cases have substantially di®erent implications for
redistribution. Hence we also construct a more direct measure of how much the tax system
compresses or redistributes income. This \income compression" measure is de¯ned as:
1 ¡
sdjt (incomeijt ¡ tax liabilityijt + transfersijt)
sdjt(incomeijt)
(2)
where the tax liability is obtained from the TAXSIM program, and i denotes the household.
The above measure is computed for households that reside in a given state j in a given year
t as one minus the ratio of the standard deviation of income after tax and transfers to the
variance of income before tax and transfers. If all households faced the same marginal tax
rate, and there were no allowances, then this measure would exactly equal the marginal (and
average) tax rate, and it would not matter which measure was used. Given that the mean
marginal tax rate conceal large di®erences in the households' marginal tax rates, the income
compression measure will be our preferred measure of redistribution through the tax system.
Table 4 displays the two tax measures for the whole of the US and for six of the largest US
states. The ¯rst column shows that the average marginal federal tax rate is 19.2 percent and
that the average marginal state tax goes from 2.2 in Pennsylvania to 6.3 in New York. The
last column of Table 4 reports the income compression measure, which averages 28.3 percent
over the whole US, but di®ers from 22.8 percent in Florida (where there is no income tax),
to 33.0 percent in New York, traditionally viewed as one of the more progressive states. This
means that the tax and transfer system is 50 percent more redistributive in New York than
in Florida. Taken together, these numbers show that there is enough variation across states
to get meaningful results, a key issue if we are to convincingly assess the model predictions.
Results will be reported for both measures (the correlation is 0.81 between the two measures).
174 The Empirical Evidence
The substantial variation of tax regimes across US states and over time we discussed in
the previous section allows us to show how the mean and standard deviation are related to
redistribution of consumption through the tax system. The regressions use year-state level
grouped data where the measures of tax redistribution vary over time and across states.
Cells are de¯ned for each state for every two years: the minimum cell size was 50 households.
Putting two years together allows more states to be included in the regressions given the
minimum cell size of 50. In choosing the cell size we face a trade-o®: choosing a higher
number of households in each cell implies fewer observations in the regression leading to
higher standard errors whereas a smaller cell size generates a larger number of observations
in the regression but increases the within cell measurement error. Setting the cell size to 50
may seem low, but for many states there are few observations: this choice leaves 34 states
to be included in the regressions with a total number of 227 observations.15
Throughout we refer to the mean and standard deviation of consumption as the mean
and standard deviation of log consumption in each cell. The ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean of consumption is de¯ned as the relative dispersion or coe±cient of variation
of consumption. All these variables were regressed on the two di®erent measures of tax
redistributiveness. To control for observed heterogeneity at the household level, the following
procedure was adopted: in the ¯rst stage household consumption was regressed against a
15Using di®erent cell sizes, or combining one, or three years together, does not qualitatively change the
results. We also experimented with trimming out the households with the highest and lowest level of
consumption, which again does not quantitatively change the results. We omit reporting these other results
in the tables for brevity.
18cubic polynomial in age, education, family-size, month, year, race, and marital status. Group
averages were then constructed from the residuals.16
4.1 Mean Consumption
Table 5 shows the results using mean consumption as the dependent variable. The ¯rst
column includes a full set of state dummies in the regression. However, while the e®ect
is as predicted by the theory, the estimated results are marginally not signi¯cant at the 10
percent level in both panel A (which reports results for our preferred measure of redistribution
through the tax system) and in panel B which reports results for the mean marginal tax
rate. The size of the e®ect shows that if the marginal income tax rate (or rather, the
equivalent redistributive measure) were reduced by 10 percent then there is a 1.8 fall in
mean consumption in panel A and a 1.5 percent decrease in panel B. A 10 percent di®erence
is roughly the di®erence between Texas and New York. This di®erence seems small.
Column (2) includes a set of year dummies in the regression, and it shows that mean
consumption decreases as the degree of taxes redistributivness increases, and the result
is signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for our preferred measure. Moreover, the estimated
coe±cient is much larger. In columns (3) and (4) we have ¯rst di®erenced the data, which
will remove any ¯xed di®erences across states. Column (4), which includes state ¯xed e®ects
in the di®erenced regression, allows for the growth rate of mean consumption to be di®erent
across states. The results in columns (3) and (4) are very similar. The coe±cients are again
negative, and signi¯cant (at the 1 percent level) in panel A. These results suggest that a 10
16Omitting these ¯rst stage controls did not substantially change the results.
19percent more redistributive tax system is reducing mean consumption by around 10 percent.
While the estimated e®ect is smaller and not signi¯cant in panel B (it is around 1.5 percent),
we believe this is due to the weakness of this tax measure in measuring redistribution.
4.2 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity:
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 5 report the current tax system regressed against the current level
of consumption. However, in part they may be co-determined. For example, a high income
shock to the state would result in estimated mean consumption to be higher, and is likely
to change the measure of tax redistribution. This is likely to bias the results. It would be
useful to look at a measure of the expected tax system where the expectation depends on
the e®ectiveness of the state administration in raising tax revenue, and the likely taste for
redistribution of the local residents in the state. We accomplish this by instrumenting the
tax system with a set of lagged political variables, and two measures of tax e±ciency.
Political variables are candidate instruments since they are likely to re°ect attitudes to-
wards redistribution, rather than general economic conditions. The political instruments
used are the relative percent of votes for the republican candidate in presidential elections;
whether the state governor was a democrat or republican, and who controlled the state leg-
islature.17 The instruments also include a measure of the tax raising ability, or tax ¯scal
capacity of the state in each period, and the tax intensity or e®ort in each period. For the
years up to 1991 the data are available from ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, 1993), while subsequent data are taken from Tannenwald (2002), although
17The data were made available by Tim Storey at the National Conference of State Legislatures.
20it was necessary to linearly interpolate the two series for some years. A full discussion of
these variables is contained in these two references.
Columns (5)-(7) in Table 5 investigate the e®ect of using the instruments. For both tax
measures, the rank test is signi¯cant in columns (5) and (6), which use state dummies, and
use state and year dummies, but fails in column (7) where the data is di®erenced. Moreover,
the Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions for the income compression
measure (panel A), and only rejects the mean marginal tax rate measure (panel B) when
the data are di®erenced (at least at the 10 percent level). Combining the rank and Sargan
tests suggests that the political variables are suitable instruments for a regression of the
tax measure on mean consumption, at least in levels. The results for levels show that the
e®ect is not only negative for both measures of the tax system, but also signi¯cant at the 1
percent level when state dummies only are included, and at the 5 percent level when year
dummies are added. When the data are di®erenced, the results in panel A (using the income
compression measure) remain signi¯cant at the 10 percent level. Overall, the results strongly
support the hypothesis that a more redistributive tax system does result in lower average
consumption. The result in column (5) suggests a 10 percent reduction in income tax (using
the redistribution measure) reduces mean consumption by 8.5 percent.
4.3 Standard Deviation of Consumption
Results for the standard deviation of log-consumption are reported in Table 6. In the ¯rst two
columns in panel A, which used our preferred measure of how redistributive the tax system
is, the estimated coe±cient in the regression is not signi¯cant, and in column (2), which
21includes both state and year dummies in the regression, is even positive. The estimated
e®ect in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in income tax rates (using the
redistributive measure) reduces inequality by one percent. Using the mean marginal tax
rate, the estimated coe±cient is not signi¯cant when only state dummies are used, but
is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level if year dummies are also included. Columns (3) and
(4) ¯rst di®erence the data to remove any ¯xed state e®ect in the amount of inequality
in each state. For our preferred measure of the tax system, the estimated coe±cient is
larger, and is signi¯cant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the results are also negative and
signi¯cant at the 5 percent level in panel B, which used the mean marginal tax rate. Both tax
measures suggest that, as we would expect, redistribution through the tax system reduces
cross-sectional inequality within the state.
The ¯nal three columns show the e®ect of instrumenting. The rank test suggests that the
the instruments are not appropriate in column (7). The Sargan test of the over-identifying
instruments is not rejected in Panel A in columns (5) and (6), but is rejected at the 10 percent
level in Panel B. This suggests that we have good instruments for the income compression
measure, but not for the mean marginal tax rate for this regression. Nevertheless, the IV-
regression results show that all six estimated coe±cients are negative. Moreover, when state
e®ects only are included in column (5), the results are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for
both tax measures. The results in panel A suggests that half the di®erence in inequality
between states can be explained by di®erences in how redistributive the tax system is. The
results remain signi¯cant at the 10 percent level for the income compression measure when
year e®ects are also included, or when the data are di®erenced (although again there is a
22large increase in the estimated coe±cient). Overall the results suggest that making the tax
system more redistributive substantially reduces the standard deviation of consumption, or
cross-sectional variability, as we would expect.
4.4 Coe±cient of Variation
Tables 5 and 6 show that both the mean and the variance of consumption are reduced when
the tax system is more redistributive, at least for our preferred measure, and in our preferred
results. The ratio of these variables is investigated in table 7. The results are broadly in
line with those reported in table 6. In the ¯rst two columns the estimated e®ect is never
signi¯cant in panel A, using our preferred measure of the tax system, but is signi¯cant at
the 10 percent level in the second column when the regression uses the mean marginal tax
rate. In columns (3) and (4), in which the data is ¯rst di®erenced, the estimated coe±cient
is larger in absolute sign, and is now signi¯cant (at the 10 percent level in the third column,
and at the 5 percent level in the fourth column). However, it is not signi¯cant when we use
the mean marginal tax system in the regression.
When the tax system is instrumented in columns (5)-(7), the results of the Sargan test are
the same as in Table 6: the Sargan test rejects the over-identifying restrictions in columns (5)
and (6) for Panel B. Combining these results with the rank test suggests that only Panel A,
columns (5) and (6), can safely be interpreted. Nevertheless, all the IV-regressions estimate
a negative e®ect on the coe±cient of variation. In column (5), when state e®ects only are
included in the regression, the results are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level in the top panel,
and at the 10 percent level in Panel B. The results are no longer signi¯cant when year
23e®ects are included, column (6), while when the data are also di®erenced, the coe±cients are
only signi¯cant at the 10 percent level in Panel A. In column (6), where year dummies are
included, the estimated coe±cient is larger, but so is the standard deviation of the estimated
coe±cient, which means that it is not signi¯cant. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by the
result in column (5) which shows that when taxes are reduced by 10 percent (roughly the
di®erence between Texas and New York) the tradeo® is between a 10 percent reduction in
mean consumption and a 50 percent reduction in inequality.
In our view these results are remarkable. Overall, the results show that the coe±cient of
variation falls as the tax system becomes more redistributive, and for our preferred measure
this di®erence is always negative, and is signi¯cant if either the data is di®erenced, or if the
tax system is instrumented as in column (5). Moreover, we know that the mean marginal tax
rate is not a good measure of how much redistribution there is through the tax system, and
this is con¯rmed by the results, which for the most part are not signi¯cant (although they
do have the same sign, in most cases as our preferred measure of the tax system). As we saw
in the theory section, in the presence of idiosyncratic risk, there is both an insurance and a
distortionary e®ect of redistributive taxes. In the model, the insurance e®ect was su±ciently
strong for the coe±cient of variation to fall with taxes, and this insight is con¯rmed by the
results in Table 7.
5 Conclusions
This paper ¯rst shows that existing macro models of idiosyncratic risk imply a strong insur-
ance e®ect of redistributive tax and transfer policies, as well as the standard distortionary
24e®ect. The ¯rst e®ect is captured by a negative relationship between taxes and the standard
deviation of consumption for any cross-section of households in the economy. The second
e®ect is shown by a negative relationship between taxes and mean consumption. We show
that such models typically imply a drop in the coe±cient of variation of consumption as
taxes become more redistributive, indicating a rather strong insurance e®ect of taxes.
We then use US-state data in order to test for these e®ects of taxation on the consumption
distribution. We exploit the high variation of taxes across states and over time; using state
data is a natural test and avoids some of the di±culties in exploiting di®erences across
countries. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis controls for some of the di®erences between US
states that might otherwise contaminate the results: we include state and time dummies in
the regression; we di®erence the data to remove any state ¯xed e®ects; and we instrument the
tax system using political and other variables. We ¯nd that both the distortionary and the
insurance e®ect on consumption are present, as there is a negative correlation between taxes
and the mean and standard deviation of consumption. Our preferred estimate (using the
income compression measure) shows that a 10 percent reduction in the tax rate reduces mean
consumption by 10 percent, but can explain half the di®erence in within state consumption
inequality across US states in our sample.18
Interestingly, we also ¯nd a negative correlation between taxes and the coe±cient of vari-
ation of consumption across states. Together with the result on the standard deviation of
consumption, this indicates the presence of a robust insurance e®ect of marginal taxation
in the data. If redistributive policies are not compressing an income process that includes
18Since we sample households aged between 25 and 55, we have already removed the di®erences in inequality
between states caused by demographic di®erences.
25idiosyncratic risk, then it is di±cult to explain why we observe a negative e®ect of redistrib-
utiveness on the standard deviation of consumption when we do not control for the standard
deviation of pre-tax income. Our study thus suggests that the insurance e®ect must be
present.
Our main conclusion is that the insurance e®ect of taxes is a non-trivial consideration for
policy analysis and that researchers should address it together with the distortionary e®ects
in carefully calibrated macro models of idiosyncratic risk. That is, insuring idiosyncratic
risk is indeed a key concern in the construction of optimal policies. Papers such as those of
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Floden (2001), Domeij and Heathcote (2002), and Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2006), thus stress an important issue in the evaluation of policies ¯nanced
through marginal income taxes.
26References
[1] Abowd, John and David Card. \On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours
Changes" Econometrica, March 1989, 57, pp. 411-45.
[2] Aiyagari, S. Rao. 1994. \Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving" Quarterly
Journal of Economics: pp. 659-684.
[3] Aiyagari, S. Rao. 1995. \Optimal Capital Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing
Constraints, and Constant Discounting" Journal of Political Economy: Vol. 103(6) pp.
1158-1175.
[4] Aiyagari, S. Rao and Ellen R. McGrattan. 1998. \The Optimum Quantity of Debt."
Journal of Monetary Economics 42, pp. 447-469.
[5] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1993. State Fiscal Capacity and
Tax E®ort - 1991. Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing O±ce.
[6] Bewley, Truman F. 1986. \Stationary Monetary Equilibrium with a Continuum of In-
dependently Fluctuating Consumers." in CContributions to Mathematical Economics
in Honor of Gerard Debreu, edited by Werner Hildenbrand and Andreu Mas-Colell,
Amsterdam: North-Holland pp. 79-102.
[7] Burnside, Craig. 1999. \Dicrete state-space methods for the study of dynamic
economies." in Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies, edited
by Ramon Marimon and Andrew Scott, Oxford University Press.
27[8] Carroll, Christopher D., 1997. \Bu®er Stock Saving and the Life Cycle / Permanent
Income Hypothesis". Quarterly Journal of Economics CXII no. 1: 3-55.
[9] |{ 2000. \Requiem for the Representative Consumer? Aggregate Implications of Micro-
economic Consumption Behavior." The American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, Vol 90 (2), pp. 110-115.
[10] Carroll, Christopher and Andrew Samwick. 1998. \How important is precautionary
saving?" Review of Economics and Statistics 80(3): 410-19.
[11] Chamley, Christophe. 1986. \Optimal Taxation of Capital and Income in General Equi-
librium with In¯nite Lives" Econometrica 54 pp. 607-622.
[12] Conessa, Juan Carlos, Sagiri Kitao and Dirk Krueger. 2006. \Taxing Capital? Not a
Bad Idea." mimeo.
[13] Deaton, Angus. 1991. \Saving and Liquidity Constraints." Econometrica 59 pp. 1221-48.
[14] Domeij, David and Jonathan Heathcote. 2004. \On the Distributional E®ects of Reduc-
ing Capital Taxes." International Economic Review, 45(2) pp. 523-554.
[15] Floden, Martin. 2001. \The E®ectiveness of Government Debt and Transfers as Insur-
ance." Journal of Monetary Economics, 48, 81-108.
[16] Freenberg D. and Coutts E., 1993, \An introduction to the TAXSIM model", Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management, 12(1)
[17] Gourinchas Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan Parker. 2002. \Consumption over the Life
Cycle." Econometrica, 70(1), 47-90.
28[18] Hubbard, Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen Zeldes. 1995. \Precautionary Saving
and Social Insurance." Journal of Political Economy, 103: 360-399.
[19] Huggett, Mark. 1993. \The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent Incomplete-
Insurance Economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17 (5-6), pp 953-69.
[20] Krusell Per and Anthony Smith 1998. \Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macro-
economy." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106(5) pp. 867-896.
[21] MaCurdy, Thomas, E., 1982 \The use of time series processes to model the error struc-
ture of earnings in longitudinal data analysis." Journal of Econometrics, 18(1), pp.
83-114.
[22] Meghir, Costas and Pistaferri, Luigi. 2004. \Income Variance Dynamics and Hetero-
geneity." Econometrica, 72(1) pp. 1-32.
[23] Tannenwald, Robert, 2002. \Interstate Fiscal Disparity in 1997." New England Eco-
nomic Review pp 17-33.
29Table 1: Income thresholds for current federal tax brackets:
Tax Rate Tax Bracket
(%) single married jointly married separately % paying
15 0 0 0 58.2
28 26,250 43,850 21,925 34.2
31 63,550 105,950 52,975 5.2
36 132,660 161,450 80,725 1.8
39.6 288,350 288,350 144,175 0.3
The data refers to 1998 and is available from the Federation of Tax Administrators at 444
N. Capital Street, Washington DC. In the table `single' refers to single ¯lers, `married
jointly' refers to married couples ¯ling jointly, while `married separately' refers to married
couples who ¯le separate tax returns. `Paying' refers to the proportion of households in
the tax bracket.
30Table 2: State Individual Income Tax Rates in the US
State Tax Rates Exemptions
low high single married dependents
Alabama 2.0 5.0 1,500 3,000 300
Alaska no state tax
Arizona 2.87 5.04 2,100 4,200 2,300
California 1.0 9.3 72* 142* 227*
Colorado 4.63 4.63 none
Florida no state tax
Georgia 1.0 6.0 2,700 5,400 2,700
Illinois 3.0 3.0 2,000 4,000 2,000
Indiana 3.4 3.4 1,000 2,000 1,000
Kentucky 2.0 6.0 20* 40* 20*
Louisiana 2.0 6.0 4,500 9,000 1,000
Maryland 2.0 4.75 1,850 3,700 1,850
Massachusetts 5.6 5.6 4,400 8,800 1,000
Michigan 4.2 4.2 2,800 5,600 2,800
Minnesota 5.35 7.85 2,900 5,800 2,900
Mississippi 3.0 5.0 6,000 12,000 1,000
Missouri 1.5 6.0 2,100 4,200 2,100
Nevada no state tax
New Jersey 1.4 6.37 1,000 2,000 1,500
New York 4.0 6.85 - - 1,000
North Carolina 6.0 7.75 2,500 5,000 2,500
Ohio 0.691 6.98 1,050 2,100 1,050
Oklahoma 0.5 6.75 1,000 2,000 1,000
Pennsylvania 2.8 2.8 none
South Carolina 2.5 7.0 2,900 5,800 2,900
Tennessee taxes unearned income only
Texas no state tax
Virginia 2.0 5.75 800 1,600 800
Washington no state tax
Wisconsin 4.6 6.75 700 1,400 400
*Refers to Tax Credits rather exempt income. The data refers to 1998 and is available from the
Federation of Tax Administrators at 444 N. Capital Street, Washington DC. The `min.' and `max.'
refers to the minimum and maximum tax bracket in the state, `single' and `married' refer to single ¯lers
and households in which the husband and wife jointly ¯le, while `dependents' refer to each additional
dependent person for which the ¯le may claim.
31Table 3: The level of wages and transfers for households in the US:
average average if received % receive
wages 32,950 34,281 96.1
social security 272 6,944 3.9
supplementary security income 73 4,339 1.6
unemployment/workers compensation 378 2,766 13.6
public assistance / welfare 166 4,216 3.9
food stamps 104 1,521 6.8
total transfer 994 4,389 22.6
Data is constructed from reported responses in the March supplement of the CPS for the years
1982-1998. Total transfer refers to the sum of social security bene¯ts, supplementary security
bene¯ts, unemployment or workers compensation, welfare or other public assistance, and food
stamps. The CPS questionnaire con°ates social security bene¯ts with railroad retirement
income, and worker's compensation with veterans payments.
Table 4: Measuring tax redistributiveness by state:
marginal rate tax bracket income compression
Federal 19.2 20.2
State:
Overall 3.7 4.2 27.7
California 5.0 5.3 30.3
Florida 0 0 22.5
New York 6.3 7.4 32.6
Ohio 3.8 4.0 28.4
Pennsylvania 2.2 2.4 26.8
Texas 0 0 22.8
Data is constructed using income from the March supplement of the CPS for 1982-1998, and
using taxes reported from the NBER TAXSIM programme. `Marginal tax rate' refers to the mean
marginal tax rate across households, the `tax bracket' is the mean tax bracket across households
while `income compression' refers to 1 minus to the ratio of the standard deviation of income before
taxes to the standard deviation of income after taxes (and transfers).
32Table 5: The e®ect of taxes on mean log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.177 -0.706 -1.071 -1.145 -0.857 -3.547 -3.951
(0.110) (0.318) (0.354) (0.395) (0.284) (1.522) (2.226)
p-value 0.111 0.028 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.078
constant 7.195 7.385 0.020 -0.171 7.659 8.530 -0.127
(0.066) (0.123) (0.014) (0.023) (0.090) (0.460) (0.100)
Sargan test 4.471 4.764 4.457
p-value (0.484) (0.445) (0.486)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.146 -0.305 -0.186 -0.148 -0.610 -1.896 -0.807
(0.090) (0.329) (0.300) (0.436) (0.200) (0.800) (3.713)
p-value 0.105 0.355 0.641 0.735 0.003 0.019 0.828
constant 7.173 7.228 0.012 -0.190 7.590 8.026 -0.194
(0.062) (0.106) (0.014) (0.022) (0.075) (0.243) (0.088)
Sargan test 5.068 7.311 9.999
p-value (0.408) (0.198) (0.075)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to
the standard deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal
tax rate. Here state refers to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year
dummies, di®. refers to whether the data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting
the tax system. All regressions control for household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
33Table 6: The e®ect of taxes on the standard deviation of log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.055 0.043 -0.756 -0.851 -0.461 -1.890 -3.267
(0.084) (0.237) (0.362) (0.370) (0.209) (1.106) (1.786)
p-value 0.509 0.855 0.038 0.023 0.028 0.089 0.069
constant 0.514 0.477 0.038 0.040 0.596 1.052 0.078
(0.050) (0.092) (0.011) (0.017) (0.066) (0.334) (0.080)
Sargan test 8.961 4.499 5.310
p-value (0.111) (0.480) (0.379)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.106 -0.467 -0.032 -0.181 -0.307 -0.555 -2.834
(0.068) (0.240) (0.376) (0.391) (0.145) (0.551) (3.250)
p-value 0.119 0.053 0.931 0.643 0.036 0.315 0.384
constant 0.517 0.613 0.032 0.026 0.555 0.651 0.010
(0.046) (0.077) (0.011) (0.017) (0.054) (0.167) (0.077)
Sargan test 10.656 9.945 8.620
p-value (0.059) (0.077) (0.125)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to
the standard deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal
tax rate. Here state refers to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year
dummies, di®. refers to whether the data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting
the tax system. All regressions control for household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
34Table 7: The e®ect of taxes on the coe±cient of variation of log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.045 0.090 -0.689 -0.779 -0.412 -1.683 -3.001
(0.083) (0.236) (0.357) (0.364) (0.206) (1.080) (1.727)
p-value 0.586 0.704 0.055 0.034 0.047 0.121 0.084
constant 0.518 0.468 0.037 0.049 0.571 0.976 0.085
(0.050) (0.091) (0.011) (0.017) (0.065) (0.326) (0.078)
Sargan test 9.245 4.992 5.749
p-value (0.100) (0.417) (0.331)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.099 -0.452 -0.015 -0.168 -0.272 -0.446 -2.761
(0.067) (0.239) (0.374) (0.387) (0.143) (0.550) (3.181)
p-value 0.145 0.061 0.966 0.664 0.060 0.418 0.387
constant 0.523 0.616 0.032 0.036 0.534 0.604 0.021
(0.046) (0.077) (0.011) (0.016) (0.053) (0.167) (0.075)
Sargan test 10.763 9.769 8.435
p-value (0.056) (0.082) (0.134)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to the standard
deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal tax rate. Here state refers
to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year dummies, di®. refers to whether the
data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting the tax system. All regressions control for
household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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1Abstract
We show that redistributive tax and transfer systems have a distortionary e®ect
and an insurance e®ect, if agents face idiosyncratic uninsurable earnings risk. These
two e®ects imply that redistributive taxes decrease both mean consumption and the
standard deviation of consumption. Using household data, we construct an `income
compression' measure of the redistributiveness of the tax system and empirically test
for the presence of these two e®ects by exploiting di®erences in US state taxes. We ¯nd
that tax redistributiveness explains much of the variation in the mean and standard
deviation of the within-state consumption distributions over the US. This provides
evidence for the presence of both distortionary and insurance e®ects of redistributive
taxes and transfers.
JEL Classi¯cation: E21, H20, H31
Keywords: Undiversi¯able Earnings Risk, Tax Distortions, Insurance
21 Introduction
Much analysis of household consumption focuses on the study of choices made by forward-
looking wealth-accumulating agents who face exogenous idiosyncratic labor-income shocks
and liquidity constraints.1 This micro approach to consumption choice has been incorporated
into workable applied macro models since the pioneering work by Bewley (1986), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994), taking macroeconomic analysis beyond the representative agent.
Yet, the inclusion of idiosyncratic risk in a macro framework gave immediate rise to policy
issues. Even in an economy with no externalities, due to market incompleteness, idiosyn-
cratic risk cannot be insured, and hence the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto e±cient.
Liquidity constraints exist in equilibrium, and agents face the probability of not being able
to smooth consumption through borrowing.2
The possibility for Pareto improvement in economies with idiosyncratic risk has led sev-
eral authors to challenge the view that marginal taxes on capital and labor income, in the
absence of externalities, always lead to welfare deteriorations.3 In a macroeconomy with
capital accumulation and idiosyncratic risk, redistributive taxes and transfers on capital and
labor income are expected to have two distinct long-run e®ects on consumption: (i) they
1For example, Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1995), and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) o®er supporting evidence that some combination of precautionary saving and/or liquidity
constraints can be important determinants of saving and consumption dynamics.
2This point is discussed in Aiyagari (1994).
3For example, Aiyagari (1995) extended the Chamley (1986) model to include idiosyncratic labor risk
and showed that the optimal long-run marginal tax on capital is positive. More recently, Conesa, Kitao and
Krueger (2006), argued that the optimal tax rate on capital should be 36% in an overlapping-generations
model with idiosyncratic risk.
3should decrease the observed long-run mean of consumption as marginal taxes reduce the
incentives for saving and capital accumulation, and (ii) they should decrease the observed
standard deviation of consumption across households, through decreasing the e®ective °uc-
tuations of after-tax individual income.4
The traditional approach without idiosyncratic risk has emphasized the ¯rst or distor-
tionary e®ect of taxes which reduces average consumption and reduces welfare. But if house-
holds face uninsured idiosyncratic risk there is also a second and countervailing insurance
e®ect of redistributive taxes which reduces each household's consumption variability and
raises welfare. The relative importance of these two e®ects is crucial for the evaluation of
¯scal policy in macro models with idiosyncratic risk. Hence it is important to empirically
test whether the distortionary and insurance e®ects of redistribution through the tax and
bene¯t system can indeed be observed in the data. To test for these e®ects is therefore a
main aim of our study.
Our analysis starts by simulating a benchmark model of idiosyncratic labor-income shocks
that demonstrates the distortionary and the insurance e®ect of redistributive taxes (and
transfers) on the stationary distribution of consumption. In models of this type, both the
mean and the standard deviation of cross-sectional consumption fall when taxes rise. For
plausible parameters, the insurance e®ect is su±ciently strong for the coe±cient of variation
to fall as taxes increase. Moreover, below some threshold (which depends on the parameters
of the model) welfare improves as taxes increase since the insurance e®ect dominates, but
4Transfers can also relax liquidity constraints, which again increases consumption smoothing and reduces
the need for precautionary saving.
4welfare falls above this threshold point.5
The core of the paper is devoted to examining the empirical evidence on the e®ect of
taxes and transfers on the mean, the standard deviation, and the coe±cient of variation of
consumption, and to quantifying this e®ect. We use data for di®erent US states (treating
each state as a small economy) to investigate the relationship within each state between
redistribution through taxes and transfers, and the distribution of household consumption.
We utilize individual consumption data from about 100,000 American households from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), while we collect household income data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). We calculate the taxes paid by each individual using
the TAXSIM program provided by the NBER. An important innovation of the paper is to
construct a measure of redistribution through the tax system. Using the mean marginal
tax rate and/or some aggregate measure of transfers has serious drawbacks (we discuss this
further below). Our study uses data on each household's income before and after taxes
to construct an income compression measure which more directly captures redistribution
through taxes and transfers.
Using observations from di®erent US states o®ers an appropriate `laboratory' in which to
test the empirical implications of the model since, as we show, variation in state-level taxes
is substantial, allowing for a meaningful interpolative analysis. In contrast, cross-country
variation may instead re°ect di®erences in institutional, cultural and other country-speci¯c
features as well as di®erences in the measurement of the appropriate household level variables
5The insurance e®ect is exactly what gives rise to the study of second-best redistributive policies in the
literature. This study does not investigate second-best taxation in a calibrated model, rather, it tests whether
the insurance e®ect is found in the data.
5in di®erent surveys. These issues are likely to be much less important when comparing across
US states. Moreover, using the same survey across tax regimes reduces the chance that
di®erences in the survey design spuriously generate the di®erent measured policy responses.
We provide evidence that redistribution through the tax and transfer system is negatively
correlated with both the mean and the variance of consumption and quantify the size of
these e®ects. We also ¯nd that the coe±cient of variation of consumption distributions
across US states is negatively correlated with redistributive income taxes, indicating a strong
insurance e®ect. Finding evidence for the presence of an insurance e®ect of taxes on observed
cross-sections of the consumption distributions has deeper implications than simply testing
the impact of policy. It demonstrates a channel through which the e®ects of idiosyncratic
risk on individual decisions are transmitted to the aggregate level. The insurance e®ect
of taxes is important and demonstrable, hence it is important to stress the appropriate
policy tradeo®s (between the distortionary and insurance e®ects) in models of taxes which
incorporate idiosyncratic risk.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we calibrate a benchmark model
economy with idiosyncratic risk and show how tax policies imply both a distortionary and
an insurance e®ect on consumption. In Section 3 we describe the data and compare the tax
system in di®erent US states. We also propose two measures of tax redistributiveness in the
di®erent US states. Section 4 presents the empirical ¯ndings and Section 5 concludes.
62 Theoretical underpinnings
In this section we solve a heterogeneous-agent model µ a la Aiyagari (1994), extended to include
an exogenous redistributive policy. We focus on the e®ects of di®erent redistributive policies
on consumption. We emphasize that the goal of this theoretical analysis is to demonstrate
the presence of the two e®ects and not to conduct a comprehensive quantitative analysis of
optimal policies.
2.1 The Model
Production of ¯nal goods takes place through a large number of identical ¯rms that use
capital and labor as inputs. All ¯rms operate a common neoclassical production technology








with ® 2 (0;1). The function F is endowed with the usual neoclassical properties: dimin-
ishing marginal returns to each factor, constant returns to scale, and the Inada conditions.









Capital depreciates in each period at the constant rate ±, implying that the user cost is
r = R ¡ ±.
We abstract from government spending on public goods, and any possible ine±ciency in
raising revenue and/or spending by governments, and concentrate solely on the redistributive
7aspect of taxes and transfers. Policies are exogenous and constant over time. The government
imposes a ¯xed and pre-speci¯ed marginal tax rate ¿ on capital and labor income and
redistributes the average tax revenues, T, to all individuals, after paying the interest cost
of the steady state government debt, Dt. The government's balanced budget constraint in
each period therefore becomes:
Tt + rDt = ¿rKt + ¿Lt
There are a large number of households that derive utility solely from the consumption
of the ¯nal good. Each household receives an idiosyncratic labor income shock. Households
can smooth their consumption pro¯le via the trading of assets Ait in a capital market that
is characterized by an (exogenous) borrowing constraint. The household pays taxes at rate
¿ on both capital and labor income, but receives a common per-capita lump-sum transfer T
that is ¯nanced from this taxation.6
There is no aggregate uncertainty, but individuals face idiosyncratic labor income shocks,
denoted by Yit. In the stationary equilibrium, all resulting asymptotic distributions in the
economy are time-invariant, even though there is substantial mobility at the individual level.
Aggregate-economy prices are therefore constant, described by the price vector fr;wg.






s.t. (for all t 2 f0;1;::g):
Cit + Ait+1 = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit + T
6US tax jurisdictions rarely distinguish between these di®erent sources of income when assessing the
household's tax liability.
8Ait+1 ¸ ¡b
where ¯ is the constant discount factor, Cit is consumption for individual i at time t; b is







with ½ > 0.
The computations we report allow no borrowing (b = 0) and ¯x the government debt to be
zero.7 Moreover, following Deaton (1991) and Aiyagari (1994), it is convenient to work with
the the total resources available for consumption, or cash on hand (Xit = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait+
(1 ¡ ¿)wYit + T), thus:
Xit+1 = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r]Ait+1 + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit+1 + T
= [1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r](Xit ¡ Cit) + (1 ¡ ¿)wYit+1 + T
Labor income risk is non-diversi¯able and therefore a®ects households' consumption
paths. Idiosyncratic labor productivity for household i follows the process:
lnYit = 'lnYit¡1 + "it (1)
where ' is close to a unit root.8
7Allowing the borrowing limit to vary exogenously, or changing the government debt, does not a®ect the
qualitative comparative statics of varying the tax rate.
8A large literature in applied labor economics on earnings dynamics either assumes that there exists a unit
root in individual earnings (see Abowd and Card, 1989, and MacCurdy, 1982) or cannot reject the hypothesis
of a unit root (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2001). We do not follow this approach in this paper for two reasons.
First, unit root tests in short panels can have low power; discriminating between a very persistent process
9Recall we assume that government policies are exogenous and constant over time. Hence
all economic agents solve their individual consumption problem given the tax rate and prices.
Prices are determined endogenously to equilibrate asset supply and the demand for capital.
We compute the joint distribution of wealth and labor income (rather than using simulations
of individual life histories) and present these distributions later on in the paper.
2.2 Implications of Varying Tax Rates
Each time period is a year. We use a CRRA coe±cient equal to 3 and ® = 0:36, so that
the labor share in production is about 2
3. The marginal tax rate ranges from zero to forty
percent in ¯ve-percent intervals. The standard deviation of the earnings shocks, ¾", is 0:1.
The depreciation rate of capital is eight percent and the discount rate ¯ve percent. The
persistence in earnings is 0:92.9
The results for some of the variables of interest are presented in Figures 1-9. Higher
taxation leads to a lower equilibrium saving rate for the economy (Figure 1), a higher gross
(and net) interest rate (Figure 2), a lower capital stock (Figure 3) and output and a higher
and a unit root might not be possible. Second, most of the general equilibrium literature with this model
uses an AR(1) process (see Aiyagari (1994), Floden (2001) and Domeij and Heathcote (2002), for instance).
For comparability reasons, we choose a model as close as possible to this speci¯cation.
9We use a seven point approximation and a quadrature method to take expectations (see Burnside (1999)
for a clear exposition of the practical issues involved). We use 100 grid points for the endogenous state
variable (cash on hand) and ensure that the maximum value of cash on hand is always higher than the
maximum possible cash on hand implied by the model (this is done by trial and error). We compute the
time invariant distribution of cash on hand explicitly (rather than using Monte Carlo simulations). Cubic
spline interpolations are used to interpolate between grid points.
10level of transfers (Figure 4). These results capture the distortionary e®ects of higher taxation.
The distortionary e®ects of higher taxes can also be seen in Figure 5 that illustrates how mean
log consumption (¹) falls quite quickly with higher taxes. On the other hand, the dispersion
(standard deviation, ¾) of log consumption in the economy falls (Figure 6); this is the
redistributive e®ect of higher transfers. Moreover, the ratio of the two (relative dispersion= ¾
¹)
falls (Figure 7), implying that the fall in mean consumption is slower than the fall in the
standard deviation of consumption.
To compare welfare we calculate the proportion of consumption that needs to be given
up in each state of the world at any particular tax rate, for households to be indi®erent
between the actual tax rate and having zero taxes. Figure 8 shows that the `most e±cient'
tax rate for our calibration is 16 percent, and agents would be indi®erent between losing
around 2.1 percent of consumption in each state of the world and moving from zero taxes
to 16 percent taxes. The ¯gure also highlights that utility is higher than the zero tax rate
economy for any tax rate under around 36 percent. Figure 9 illustrates more clearly what
happens to the unconditional wealth distribution when taxes are raised. The reduction in
inequality is clearly illustrated: the wealth distribution is always compressed with higher
taxes and transfers.
Figures 1-9 highlight that redistributive taxes can improve welfare if taxes are not too
high, since the insurance e®ect will dominate the distortionary e®ect. But at higher tax rates
the distortionary e®ect will dominate, reducing welfare. These turning points will depend on
the parameters of the model. Our conclusions are robust to varying the structural parameters
of the model. As a general rule, varying structural parameters that increase the value of
11risk-sharing (such as more earnings persistence or higher risk-aversion) increases the value
of redistributive taxation. However higher risk-sharing takes place at the cost of increased
production distortions which reduces mean consumption.10
3 Data
The simple theoretical model illustrates the e®ects of taxes on the ¯rst two consumption mo-
ments. Our empirical analysis explores this further, but ¯rst we describe the data. Household
consumption is measured using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX): a survey of US
households that has operated on a continuous basis since 1980 and has detailed informa-
tion on consumer expenditure and saving. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects
the data to construct the consumer price index and hence the data-set contains extremely
detailed information on the individual components of consumption, as well as a variety of
household characteristics. It also includes the state of residence.11 The survey is designed as
a rotating panel, with households being interviewed 5 times at quarterly intervals (although
the ¯rst is a contact interview from which no information is made available). Each quarter,
households reaching their ¯fth interview are replaced by a new household. Since the sur-
vey records detailed information on each individual expenditure item, we can construct a
measure of non-durable consumption that includes food and beverages, tobacco, housekeep-
ing services, fuel, public utilities, repairs, public transport, personal care, entertainment,
10Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000) argue that di®erences across agents in their rate of time
preference better matches the observed US wealth distribution. Our theoretical results are robust to allowing
heterogeneity in discount rates.
11For con¯dentiality reasons, state information is sometimes suppressed.
12clothing and books, each de°ated by the appropriate price index. We restrict the sample to
those households for which full state information is available, that were interviewed between
1982-1998 and where the head is between the ages of 25 and 55. Furthermore, self-employed
and farming households have been excluded. This results in a sample of around 100,000
households.
Information on household level income and transfers is obtained from the March supple-
ment of the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a Census survey also run by the BLS
and designed to give very detailed and accurate information on income and demographics.
Income is de¯ned as total household labor income. We use income data from the CPS be-
cause it has the advantage of being a much larger survey than the CEX. Another advantage
is that the errors with which income and consumption are measured are likely to be cor-
related when they are taken from the same survey while this is less likely when they come
from di®erent surveys.12
3.1 Household Taxes
Constructing a measure of the tax system in each state is not trivial and entails addressing a
number of problems. We concentrate on income tax, which is raised at both the federal and
state level.13 Income tax systems can be quite complicated, and vary considerably across
12Correlated errors on the LHS and RHS in the regression will bias the regression, and the direction of
this bias can not be determined a priori.
13US households are subject to many di®erent taxes (including income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes
and duty) levied at the federal and state levels, by county administrations, and by schoolboards. We
concentrate on income tax, which is raised at both the federal and state level: our identi¯cation strategy
exploits variation across, but not within, states. Speci¯cally, property taxes and sales taxes are largely levied
13jurisdictions. Table 1 illustrates the complexity of the federal income tax system in 1998:
the federal marginal tax rate varies non-linearly from 15 percent for single people whose
income is less than $26,250 ($43,850 for married couples) up to 39.6 percent for incomes over
$288,350. Furthermore, these tax rates and tax brackets have all changed over the years.
Before 1987 a much larger number of tax brackets was applicable, while before 1996 around
15-20 percent of people had incomes that were not su±ciently high for them to pay any
federal income tax.
Table 2 shows that state marginal tax rates and exemptions di®er widely between states.
It shows that several states, including Texas and Florida, do not levy any income tax on
their residents while New Hampshire and Tennessee only charge tax on dividend and interest
income. The other states have a variety of income tax bands and exemptions (or tax credits)
that are applicable. Although some states, such as Massachusetts and Illinois, have a °at
rate income tax, in most states, the marginal tax rate increases with income. The di®erence
between the highest and lowest marginal tax rate can sometimes be large. In Iowa the lowest
marginal tax rate is 0.36 percent and the highest is 8.98, while several states have marginal
tax rates even higher for the highest earning households. There are also, typically, a variety
of tax allowances to which households are entitled. While there is no tax exempt income in
Pennsylvania, up to $24,000 of income is exempt from state income tax in Connecticut for
at the county/schoolboard/city level which makes it problematic to construct a state level tax measure as
the taxes vary substantially within each state. Moreover, sales taxes are paid at the place of sale rather
than residence, making it di±cult to measure the sales taxes levied on households within the state if cross-
border shopping takes place. In the CEX, the spending ¯gure excludes sales taxes, which makes expenditure
comparable across states.
14married couples. However, Connecticut allows no exempt income for other dependents, in
contrast to Minnesota which allows the same exempt level of income for the earner, their
partner, and each other dependent.
To measure how much redistribution there is through the tax system, information on
transfers is also required; this comes from the CPS. Such transfers include social security and
railroad retirement income, supplementary security income, unemployment compensation,
worker's compensation and veterans payments, public assistance or welfare, and the value
of food stamps received: the CPS asks questions on all these transfers. Table 3 shows that
the average transfer over the whole sampled population amounts to $994, while 22.6 percent
of households receive some sort of transfer. Conditional on receiving at least something,
households receive an average of $4,389. This should be compared to the average household
salary in the survey of $34,281, or $19,483 for those households that are receiving transfers.
While this amount may seem small, for some households it can make a substantial di®erence
to their after tax (and transfer) income.
To construct each household's income tax burden, we exploit the TAXSIM 4.0 program
developed by Freenberg (see Freenberg and Coutts, 1993, for details) which is provided by
the NBER.14 The output of the TAXSIM program allows us to measure of how redistributive
the tax system is in each state. If the marginal tax rate was the same for all households in
14Using a variety of household variables, including a husband's and wife's earnings, interest, dividends
and other income, and information about the household's characteristics (such as the number of dependant
children) and other deductibles (like property costs) as well as the year and state of residence, the program
calculates both the state and the federal tax bracket, tax liability, and marginal tax rate for each household
in the sample, explicitly controlling for a variety of allowances.
15a year and state, then this would be the natural measure of redistributiveness. However, as
we saw earlier, marginal taxes di®er substantially across agents even within the same year
and state. Furthermore, agents have many exemptions, allowances, and transfers available
to them that depend upon their household characteristics. Rather than explicitly model
all the di®erent e®ective marginal taxes (and transfers) that are available, we will instead
reduce the problem to constructing an index that re°ects the \average" marginal tax rate
in each state. While a simpli¯cation, this will allow us to concentrate on how variation in
redistribution through taxes and transfers a®ects consumers.
3.2 Measuring Redistributiveness
No completely satisfactory measure of redistributiveness exists, but some measures are pos-
sible given the output provided by the TAXSIM program. An obvious one is to compute the
average marginal tax rate within each year t and state j. This is calculated as the mean of
the household marginal tax rates obtained from the TAXSIM program. As table 4 shows, the
average federal bracket is 20.2 percent, and the average marginal tax rate (which accounts
for various allowances) is 19.2 percent. The state rates shown in the table vary from zero
in Texas and Florida, which charge no income tax, to an average marginal tax rate of 7.4
percent in New York.
This measure, however, accounts neither for transfers nor for heterogeneity amongst
household tax rates. For instance, a mean marginal tax rate of 20 per cent in a state could
be due to all households paying a marginal tax rate of 20 per cent; to the bottom ¯fth of the
population paying 100 percent and the rest nothing; or to the top 20 per cent paying 100
16percent and the rest nothing. These three cases have substantially di®erent implications for
redistribution. Hence we also construct a more direct measure of how much the tax system
compresses or redistributes income. This \income compression" measure is de¯ned as:
1 ¡
sdjt (incomeijt ¡ tax liabilityijt + transfersijt)
sdjt(incomeijt)
(2)
where the tax liability is obtained from the TAXSIM program, and i denotes the household.
The above measure is computed for households that reside in a given state j in a given year
t as one minus the ratio of the standard deviation of income after tax and transfers to the
variance of income before tax and transfers. If all households faced the same marginal tax
rate, and there were no allowances, then this measure would exactly equal the marginal (and
average) tax rate, and it would not matter which measure was used. Given that the mean
marginal tax rate conceal large di®erences in the households' marginal tax rates, the income
compression measure will be our preferred measure of redistribution through the tax system.
Table 4 displays the two tax measures for the whole of the US and for six of the largest US
states. The ¯rst column shows that the average marginal federal tax rate is 19.2 percent and
that the average marginal state tax goes from 2.2 in Pennsylvania to 6.3 in New York. The
last column of Table 4 reports the income compression measure, which averages 28.3 percent
over the whole US, but di®ers from 22.8 percent in Florida (where there is no income tax),
to 33.0 percent in New York, traditionally viewed as one of the more progressive states. This
means that the tax and transfer system is 50 percent more redistributive in New York than
in Florida. Taken together, these numbers show that there is enough variation across states
to get meaningful results, a key issue if we are to convincingly assess the model predictions.
Results will be reported for both measures (the correlation is 0.81 between the two measures).
174 The Empirical Evidence
The substantial variation of tax regimes across US states and over time we discussed in
the previous section allows us to show how the mean and standard deviation are related to
redistribution of consumption through the tax system. The regressions use year-state level
grouped data where the measures of tax redistribution vary over time and across states.
Cells are de¯ned for each state for every two years: the minimum cell size was 50 households.
Putting two years together allows more states to be included in the regressions given the
minimum cell size of 50. In choosing the cell size we face a trade-o®: choosing a higher
number of households in each cell implies fewer observations in the regression leading to
higher standard errors whereas a smaller cell size generates a larger number of observations
in the regression but increases the within cell measurement error. Setting the cell size to 50
may seem low, but for many states there are few observations: this choice leaves 34 states
to be included in the regressions with a total number of 227 observations.15
Throughout we refer to the mean and standard deviation of consumption as the mean
and standard deviation of log consumption in each cell. The ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean of consumption is de¯ned as the relative dispersion or coe±cient of variation
of consumption. All these variables were regressed on the two di®erent measures of tax
redistributiveness. To control for observed heterogeneity at the household level, the following
procedure was adopted: in the ¯rst stage household consumption was regressed against a
15Using di®erent cell sizes, or combining one, or three years together, does not qualitatively change the
results. We also experimented with trimming out the households with the highest and lowest level of
consumption, which again does not quantitatively change the results. We omit reporting these other results
in the tables for brevity.
18cubic polynomial in age, education, family-size, month, year, race, and marital status. Group
averages were then constructed from the residuals.16
4.1 Mean Consumption
Table 5 shows the results using mean consumption as the dependent variable. The ¯rst
column includes a full set of state dummies in the regression. However, while the e®ect
is as predicted by the theory, the estimated results are marginally not signi¯cant at the 10
percent level in both panel A (which reports results for our preferred measure of redistribution
through the tax system) and in panel B which reports results for the mean marginal tax
rate. The size of the e®ect shows that if the marginal income tax rate (or rather, the
equivalent redistributive measure) were reduced by 10 percent then there is a 1.8 fall in
mean consumption in panel A and a 1.5 percent decrease in panel B. A 10 percent di®erence
is roughly the di®erence between Texas and New York. This di®erence seems small.
Column (2) includes a set of year dummies in the regression, and it shows that mean
consumption decreases as the degree of taxes redistributivness increases, and the result
is signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for our preferred measure. Moreover, the estimated
coe±cient is much larger. In columns (3) and (4) we have ¯rst di®erenced the data, which
will remove any ¯xed di®erences across states. Column (4), which includes state ¯xed e®ects
in the di®erenced regression, allows for the growth rate of mean consumption to be di®erent
across states. The results in columns (3) and (4) are very similar. The coe±cients are again
negative, and signi¯cant (at the 1 percent level) in panel A. These results suggest that a 10
16Omitting these ¯rst stage controls did not substantially change the results.
19percent more redistributive tax system is reducing mean consumption by around 10 percent.
While the estimated e®ect is smaller and not signi¯cant in panel B (it is around 1.5 percent),
we believe this is due to the weakness of this tax measure in measuring redistribution.
4.2 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity:
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 5 report the current tax system regressed against the current level
of consumption. However, in part they may be co-determined. For example, a high income
shock to the state would result in estimated mean consumption to be higher, and is likely
to change the measure of tax redistribution. This is likely to bias the results. It would be
useful to look at a measure of the expected tax system where the expectation depends on
the e®ectiveness of the state administration in raising tax revenue, and the likely taste for
redistribution of the local residents in the state. We accomplish this by instrumenting the
tax system with a set of lagged political variables, and two measures of tax e±ciency.
Political variables are candidate instruments since they are likely to re°ect attitudes to-
wards redistribution, rather than general economic conditions. The political instruments
used are the relative percent of votes for the republican candidate in presidential elections;
whether the state governor was a democrat or republican, and who controlled the state leg-
islature.17 The instruments also include a measure of the tax raising ability, or tax ¯scal
capacity of the state in each period, and the tax intensity or e®ort in each period. For the
years up to 1991 the data are available from ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, 1993), while subsequent data are taken from Tannenwald (2002), although
17The data were made available by Tim Storey at the National Conference of State Legislatures.
20it was necessary to linearly interpolate the two series for some years. A full discussion of
these variables is contained in these two references.
Columns (5)-(7) in Table 5 investigate the e®ect of using the instruments. For both tax
measures, the rank test is signi¯cant in columns (5) and (6), which use state dummies, and
use state and year dummies, but fails in column (7) where the data is di®erenced. Moreover,
the Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions for the income compression
measure (panel A), and only rejects the mean marginal tax rate measure (panel B) when
the data are di®erenced (at least at the 10 percent level). Combining the rank and Sargan
tests suggests that the political variables are suitable instruments for a regression of the
tax measure on mean consumption, at least in levels. The results for levels show that the
e®ect is not only negative for both measures of the tax system, but also signi¯cant at the 1
percent level when state dummies only are included, and at the 5 percent level when year
dummies are added. When the data are di®erenced, the results in panel A (using the income
compression measure) remain signi¯cant at the 10 percent level. Overall, the results strongly
support the hypothesis that a more redistributive tax system does result in lower average
consumption. The result in column (5) suggests a 10 percent reduction in income tax (using
the redistribution measure) reduces mean consumption by 8.5 percent.
4.3 Standard Deviation of Consumption
Results for the standard deviation of log-consumption are reported in Table 6. In the ¯rst two
columns in panel A, which used our preferred measure of how redistributive the tax system
is, the estimated coe±cient in the regression is not signi¯cant, and in column (2), which
21includes both state and year dummies in the regression, is even positive. The estimated
e®ect in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in income tax rates (using the
redistributive measure) reduces inequality by one percent. Using the mean marginal tax
rate, the estimated coe±cient is not signi¯cant when only state dummies are used, but
is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level if year dummies are also included. Columns (3) and
(4) ¯rst di®erence the data to remove any ¯xed state e®ect in the amount of inequality
in each state. For our preferred measure of the tax system, the estimated coe±cient is
larger, and is signi¯cant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the results are also negative and
signi¯cant at the 5 percent level in panel B, which used the mean marginal tax rate. Both tax
measures suggest that, as we would expect, redistribution through the tax system reduces
cross-sectional inequality within the state.
The ¯nal three columns show the e®ect of instrumenting. The rank test suggests that the
the instruments are not appropriate in column (7). The Sargan test of the over-identifying
instruments is not rejected in Panel A in columns (5) and (6), but is rejected at the 10 percent
level in Panel B. This suggests that we have good instruments for the income compression
measure, but not for the mean marginal tax rate for this regression. Nevertheless, the IV-
regression results show that all six estimated coe±cients are negative. Moreover, when state
e®ects only are included in column (5), the results are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for
both tax measures. The results in panel A suggests that half the di®erence in inequality
between states can be explained by di®erences in how redistributive the tax system is. The
results remain signi¯cant at the 10 percent level for the income compression measure when
year e®ects are also included, or when the data are di®erenced (although again there is a
22large increase in the estimated coe±cient). Overall the results suggest that making the tax
system more redistributive substantially reduces the standard deviation of consumption, or
cross-sectional variability, as we would expect.
4.4 Coe±cient of Variation
Tables 5 and 6 show that both the mean and the variance of consumption are reduced when
the tax system is more redistributive, at least for our preferred measure, and in our preferred
results. The ratio of these variables is investigated in table 7. The results are broadly in
line with those reported in table 6. In the ¯rst two columns the estimated e®ect is never
signi¯cant in panel A, using our preferred measure of the tax system, but is signi¯cant at
the 10 percent level in the second column when the regression uses the mean marginal tax
rate. In columns (3) and (4), in which the data is ¯rst di®erenced, the estimated coe±cient
is larger in absolute sign, and is now signi¯cant (at the 10 percent level in the third column,
and at the 5 percent level in the fourth column). However, it is not signi¯cant when we use
the mean marginal tax system in the regression.
When the tax system is instrumented in columns (5)-(7), the results of the Sargan test are
the same as in Table 6: the Sargan test rejects the over-identifying restrictions in columns (5)
and (6) for Panel B. Combining these results with the rank test suggests that only Panel A,
columns (5) and (6), can safely be interpreted. Nevertheless, all the IV-regressions estimate
a negative e®ect on the coe±cient of variation. In column (5), when state e®ects only are
included in the regression, the results are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level in the top panel,
and at the 10 percent level in Panel B. The results are no longer signi¯cant when year
23e®ects are included, column (6), while when the data are also di®erenced, the coe±cients are
only signi¯cant at the 10 percent level in Panel A. In column (6), where year dummies are
included, the estimated coe±cient is larger, but so is the standard deviation of the estimated
coe±cient, which means that it is not signi¯cant. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by the
result in column (5) which shows that when taxes are reduced by 10 percent (roughly the
di®erence between Texas and New York) the tradeo® is between a 10 percent reduction in
mean consumption and a 50 percent reduction in inequality.
In our view these results are remarkable. Overall, the results show that the coe±cient of
variation falls as the tax system becomes more redistributive, and for our preferred measure
this di®erence is always negative, and is signi¯cant if either the data is di®erenced, or if the
tax system is instrumented as in column (5). Moreover, we know that the mean marginal tax
rate is not a good measure of how much redistribution there is through the tax system, and
this is con¯rmed by the results, which for the most part are not signi¯cant (although they
do have the same sign, in most cases as our preferred measure of the tax system). As we saw
in the theory section, in the presence of idiosyncratic risk, there is both an insurance and a
distortionary e®ect of redistributive taxes. In the model, the insurance e®ect was su±ciently
strong for the coe±cient of variation to fall with taxes, and this insight is con¯rmed by the
results in Table 7.
5 Conclusions
This paper ¯rst shows that existing macro models of idiosyncratic risk imply a strong insur-
ance e®ect of redistributive tax and transfer policies, as well as the standard distortionary
24e®ect. The ¯rst e®ect is captured by a negative relationship between taxes and the standard
deviation of consumption for any cross-section of households in the economy. The second
e®ect is shown by a negative relationship between taxes and mean consumption. We show
that such models typically imply a drop in the coe±cient of variation of consumption as
taxes become more redistributive, indicating a rather strong insurance e®ect of taxes.
We then use US-state data in order to test for these e®ects of taxation on the consumption
distribution. We exploit the high variation of taxes across states and over time; using state
data is a natural test and avoids some of the di±culties in exploiting di®erences across
countries. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis controls for some of the di®erences between US
states that might otherwise contaminate the results: we include state and time dummies in
the regression; we di®erence the data to remove any state ¯xed e®ects; and we instrument the
tax system using political and other variables. We ¯nd that both the distortionary and the
insurance e®ect on consumption are present, as there is a negative correlation between taxes
and the mean and standard deviation of consumption. Our preferred estimate (using the
income compression measure) shows that a 10 percent reduction in the tax rate reduces mean
consumption by 10 percent, but can explain half the di®erence in within state consumption
inequality across US states in our sample.18
Interestingly, we also ¯nd a negative correlation between taxes and the coe±cient of vari-
ation of consumption across states. Together with the result on the standard deviation of
consumption, this indicates the presence of a robust insurance e®ect of marginal taxation
in the data. If redistributive policies are not compressing an income process that includes
18Since we sample households aged between 25 and 55, we have already removed the di®erences in inequality
between states caused by demographic di®erences.
25idiosyncratic risk, then it is di±cult to explain why we observe a negative e®ect of redistrib-
utiveness on the standard deviation of consumption when we do not control for the standard
deviation of pre-tax income. Our study thus suggests that the insurance e®ect must be
present.
Our main conclusion is that the insurance e®ect of taxes is a non-trivial consideration for
policy analysis and that researchers should address it together with the distortionary e®ects
in carefully calibrated macro models of idiosyncratic risk. That is, insuring idiosyncratic
risk is indeed a key concern in the construction of optimal policies. Papers such as those of
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Floden (2001), Domeij and Heathcote (2002), and Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2006), thus stress an important issue in the evaluation of policies ¯nanced
through marginal income taxes.
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29Table 1: Income thresholds for current federal tax brackets:
Tax Rate Tax Bracket
(%) single married jointly married separately % paying
15 0 0 0 58.2
28 26,250 43,850 21,925 34.2
31 63,550 105,950 52,975 5.2
36 132,660 161,450 80,725 1.8
39.6 288,350 288,350 144,175 0.3
The data refers to 1998 and is available from the Federation of Tax Administrators at 444
N. Capital Street, Washington DC. In the table `single' refers to single ¯lers, `married
jointly' refers to married couples ¯ling jointly, while `married separately' refers to married
couples who ¯le separate tax returns. `Paying' refers to the proportion of households in
the tax bracket.
30Table 2: State Individual Income Tax Rates in the US
State Tax Rates Exemptions
low high single married dependents
Alabama 2.0 5.0 1,500 3,000 300
Alaska no state tax
Arizona 2.87 5.04 2,100 4,200 2,300
California 1.0 9.3 72* 142* 227*
Colorado 4.63 4.63 none
Florida no state tax
Georgia 1.0 6.0 2,700 5,400 2,700
Illinois 3.0 3.0 2,000 4,000 2,000
Indiana 3.4 3.4 1,000 2,000 1,000
Kentucky 2.0 6.0 20* 40* 20*
Louisiana 2.0 6.0 4,500 9,000 1,000
Maryland 2.0 4.75 1,850 3,700 1,850
Massachusetts 5.6 5.6 4,400 8,800 1,000
Michigan 4.2 4.2 2,800 5,600 2,800
Minnesota 5.35 7.85 2,900 5,800 2,900
Mississippi 3.0 5.0 6,000 12,000 1,000
Missouri 1.5 6.0 2,100 4,200 2,100
Nevada no state tax
New Jersey 1.4 6.37 1,000 2,000 1,500
New York 4.0 6.85 - - 1,000
North Carolina 6.0 7.75 2,500 5,000 2,500
Ohio 0.691 6.98 1,050 2,100 1,050
Oklahoma 0.5 6.75 1,000 2,000 1,000
Pennsylvania 2.8 2.8 none
South Carolina 2.5 7.0 2,900 5,800 2,900
Tennessee taxes unearned income only
Texas no state tax
Virginia 2.0 5.75 800 1,600 800
Washington no state tax
Wisconsin 4.6 6.75 700 1,400 400
*Refers to Tax Credits rather exempt income. The data refers to 1998 and is available from the
Federation of Tax Administrators at 444 N. Capital Street, Washington DC. The `min.' and `max.'
refers to the minimum and maximum tax bracket in the state, `single' and `married' refer to single ¯lers
and households in which the husband and wife jointly ¯le, while `dependents' refer to each additional
dependent person for which the ¯le may claim.
31Table 3: The level of wages and transfers for households in the US:
average average if received % receive
wages 32,950 34,281 96.1
social security 272 6,944 3.9
supplementary security income 73 4,339 1.6
unemployment/workers compensation 378 2,766 13.6
public assistance / welfare 166 4,216 3.9
food stamps 104 1,521 6.8
total transfer 994 4,389 22.6
Data is constructed from reported responses in the March supplement of the CPS for the years
1982-1998. Total transfer refers to the sum of social security bene¯ts, supplementary security
bene¯ts, unemployment or workers compensation, welfare or other public assistance, and food
stamps. The CPS questionnaire con°ates social security bene¯ts with railroad retirement
income, and worker's compensation with veterans payments.
Table 4: Measuring tax redistributiveness by state:
marginal rate tax bracket income compression
Federal 19.2 20.2
State:
Overall 3.7 4.2 27.7
California 5.0 5.3 30.3
Florida 0 0 22.5
New York 6.3 7.4 32.6
Ohio 3.8 4.0 28.4
Pennsylvania 2.2 2.4 26.8
Texas 0 0 22.8
Data is constructed using income from the March supplement of the CPS for 1982-1998, and
using taxes reported from the NBER TAXSIM programme. `Marginal tax rate' refers to the mean
marginal tax rate across households, the `tax bracket' is the mean tax bracket across households
while `income compression' refers to 1 minus to the ratio of the standard deviation of income before
taxes to the standard deviation of income after taxes (and transfers).
32Table 5: The e®ect of taxes on mean log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.177 -0.706 -1.071 -1.145 -0.857 -3.547 -3.951
(0.110) (0.318) (0.354) (0.395) (0.284) (1.522) (2.226)
p-value 0.111 0.028 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.078
constant 7.195 7.385 0.020 -0.171 7.659 8.530 -0.127
(0.066) (0.123) (0.014) (0.023) (0.090) (0.460) (0.100)
Sargan test 4.471 4.764 4.457
p-value (0.484) (0.445) (0.486)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.146 -0.305 -0.186 -0.148 -0.610 -1.896 -0.807
(0.090) (0.329) (0.300) (0.436) (0.200) (0.800) (3.713)
p-value 0.105 0.355 0.641 0.735 0.003 0.019 0.828
constant 7.173 7.228 0.012 -0.190 7.590 8.026 -0.194
(0.062) (0.106) (0.014) (0.022) (0.075) (0.243) (0.088)
Sargan test 5.068 7.311 9.999
p-value (0.408) (0.198) (0.075)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to
the standard deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal
tax rate. Here state refers to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year
dummies, di®. refers to whether the data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting
the tax system. All regressions control for household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
33Table 6: The e®ect of taxes on the standard deviation of log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.055 0.043 -0.756 -0.851 -0.461 -1.890 -3.267
(0.084) (0.237) (0.362) (0.370) (0.209) (1.106) (1.786)
p-value 0.509 0.855 0.038 0.023 0.028 0.089 0.069
constant 0.514 0.477 0.038 0.040 0.596 1.052 0.078
(0.050) (0.092) (0.011) (0.017) (0.066) (0.334) (0.080)
Sargan test 8.961 4.499 5.310
p-value (0.111) (0.480) (0.379)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.106 -0.467 -0.032 -0.181 -0.307 -0.555 -2.834
(0.068) (0.240) (0.376) (0.391) (0.145) (0.551) (3.250)
p-value 0.119 0.053 0.931 0.643 0.036 0.315 0.384
constant 0.517 0.613 0.032 0.026 0.555 0.651 0.010
(0.046) (0.077) (0.011) (0.017) (0.054) (0.167) (0.077)
Sargan test 10.656 9.945 8.620
p-value (0.059) (0.077) (0.125)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to
the standard deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal
tax rate. Here state refers to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year
dummies, di®. refers to whether the data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting
the tax system. All regressions control for household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
34Table 7: The e®ect of taxes on the coe±cient of variation of log-consumption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
tax rate -0.045 0.090 -0.689 -0.779 -0.412 -1.683 -3.001
(0.083) (0.236) (0.357) (0.364) (0.206) (1.080) (1.727)
p-value 0.586 0.704 0.055 0.034 0.047 0.121 0.084
constant 0.518 0.468 0.037 0.049 0.571 0.976 0.085
(0.050) (0.091) (0.011) (0.017) (0.065) (0.326) (0.078)
Sargan test 9.245 4.992 5.749
p-value (0.100) (0.417) (0.331)
Rank test 8.36 11.24 1.12
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.353)
Panel B:
tax rate -0.099 -0.452 -0.015 -0.168 -0.272 -0.446 -2.761
(0.067) (0.239) (0.374) (0.387) (0.143) (0.550) (3.181)
p-value 0.145 0.061 0.966 0.664 0.060 0.418 0.387
constant 0.523 0.616 0.032 0.036 0.534 0.604 0.021
(0.046) (0.077) (0.011) (0.016) (0.053) (0.167) (0.075)
Sargan test 10.763 9.769 8.435
p-value (0.056) (0.082) (0.134)
Rank test 2.42 8.51 1.18
p-value (0.038) (0.000) ( 0.323)
Dummies:
state yes yes yes yes yes yes
year yes yes yes yes yes
di®. yes yes yes
instr. yes yes yes
Panel A refers to regressions involving the ratio of the standard deviation of after tax income to the standard
deviation of before tax income, while Panel B refers to using the mean marginal tax rate. Here state refers
to the inclusion of state dummies, year refers to the inclusion of year dummies, di®. refers to whether the
data was ¯rst-di®erenced, while instr. refers to instrumenting the tax system. All regressions control for
household characteristics. The cell size was 50. Huber standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
35Figure 1:Figure 2: